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MARYLAND LAW REVIEW
collect its debts, cannot be bound by either legislative or
judicial acts of a member state". 9 The constitutional ques-
tions raised by this decision are beyond the scope of this
comment. It is well to note, however, that the Maryland
wage-exemption statute expressly does not apply to collec-
tion by the State of its income tax.
In conclusion, it may justifiably be said that the Mary-
land Court has been ready at all times to reach an equitable
result and has been aided in that purpose somewhat by the
broad language of the wage exemption statute which it was
considering. Furthermore, the Court has struck down any
subterfuge set up to defeat the statute's protection of the
wage-earner.50 Much can be said, therefore, for a broad
statute in an area, such as here, where the solution to the
situations which arise is best reached many times by broad
discretionary powers in the Court.
Federal Policy Regarding Evidence
Illegally Seized
Rea v. United States'
Federal narcotics officers, under a void search warrant,
arrested petitioner, George Rea, and seized marihuana in
his possession. Rea was then indicted in the United States
District Court for the District of New Mexico for violation
of the Marihuana Tax Act, and while awaiting trial, moved
that the evidence so obtained be suppressed. The motion
was granted and the district attorney then moved for
dismissal.
Thereafter, upon complaint signed by a federal nar-
cotics officer, petitioner was indicted in a New Mexico state
court for having been in possession of marihuana contrary
to a local criminal statute. Before trial in the state proceed-
ing, petitioner again went to the federal court, filing a
motion for a contempt show cause order to enjoin the nar-
cotics officers: (1) from testifying in the state trial, and
(2) from handing over the illegally seized evidence to state
,0 Ibid, 278.
10 See Keyser v. Rice, 47 Md. 203 (1877), where the Court enjoined a
judgment creditor from attaching a debtor's salary out of state with intent
to avoid the Maryland wage exemption statute.
The Legislature has been equally harsh In deterring the assignment of
claims out of state with the purpose of avoiding the wage exemption
granted in the statute. Md. Code (1951) Art. 83, Secs. 15, 16, 17 and 18,
provides civil remedies for the debtor and criminal penalties for the assignor.
I ... U. S ... , 76 S. Ct. 292 (1956).
[VOL. XVI240
1956] REA v. UNITED STATES
authorities. The District Court denied the motion,2 and
the Court of Appeals affirmed; but on certiorari to the
United States Supreme Court, the decision was reversed
(5-4).
The Supreme Court held: that a federal law enforce-
ment agent who has obtained evidence as a result of an
unreasonable search and seizure should be enjoined from
introducing such evidence in a state criminal trial and from
testifying as to facts disclosed by such illegal search.4
NATURE OF THE RELIEF AFFORDED
Speaking for the majority, Mr. Justice Douglas empha-
sized the fact that the injunctive relief was directed to the
wrongdoer himself and not the forum of attempted intro-
duction, stating that, "The command of the federal Rules
is in no way affected by anything that happens in a state
court."5 This would appear to be an attempt to minimize
'United States District Court for District of New Mexico, unreported
decision.
8Rea v. United States, 218 F. 2d 237 (10th Cir. 1954).
'One writer, in commenting upon this case, has chosen to confine its
holding to a much narrower scope. He said:
" . . (T)he case should, perhaps, be read ,to mean that a Federal
injunction will issue against the offending Federal officer only where
he has been subjected to a prior Federal auppression order, that is,
where the issue of the federally unconstitutional character of the
search and seizure has already been determined in previous proceed-
ings against the defendant in a federal court." Note, Availability of
Federal Injunction to Prevent Federal Officer from Testifying in State
Court Concerning Evidence Obtained in the Course of an Unlawful
Search, 44 Ill. Bar J. 639, 642 (1956).
This position appears untenable; inasmuch as the Illegality of the search
is an essential element of the plaintiff's case in the injunction proceeding,
it is unreasonable to assume that prior determination of that Issue is
necessary. In this case, the prior suppression order served only to establish
the fact of illegality at an earlier point of time.
In addition to this, examination of counsels' briefs reveals that the
problem, as argued to the Court, was not confined to such narrow interpre-
tation, but was developed generally:
"... (T)he issue is whether the federal rule ... extends so far as
to bar federal officers from testifying in a state prosecution for a state
offense even though in so doing they would act merely as witnesses in
the state proceeding."
Brief For the United States on Writ of Certiorari, Rea v. United States,
p. 11 (1955). See also, Brief For the United States in Opposition On Peti-
tion for a Writ of Certiorari, Rea v. United States, (1955), where, at p. 5,
the Solicitor General said:
"As the court below recognized, the net effect sought by petitioner's
application is to have the federal courts control and limit the evidence
which may be available to a state court for prosecution of a state crime."
Note also the general manner In which the problem was treated In the
Brief for the Petitioner on Writ of Certiorari, Rea v. United States, (1955),
also not raising the question of prior determination, except as, at p. 34,
it makes the point that such prior finding rendered the question of illegality
re8 Judicata.
5 Supra, n. 1, p. 294.
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the true nature of the court's action since it ignores the
ever-present considerations brought into play by the su-
premacy clause of the federal constitution.'
What if the state court should subsequently subpoena
the enjoined federal officer and demand his appearance?
In the answer to this crucial question lies the key to an
understanding of the case. If subpoenaed, the officer-wit-
ness would be caught between contradictory court pro-
cesses, one of which would have to be obeyed.
The problem of conflicting federal-state court orders was
resolved early in the classic decisions of Ableman v. Booth
and United States v. Booth.7 After conviction and sentence
in a United States district court, a prisoner was released
by the Wisconsin Supreme Court on writ of habeas corpus.
The Supreme Court of the United States settled the issue
by writ of error to the Wisconsin court, dismissing the
habeas corpus and upholding the supremacy of the federal
order. Thirteen years later the question was again pre-
sented under similar circumstances.' The Court affirmed
its prior holding, saying:
"The decision of this court in the two cases which
grew out of the arrest of Booth.. . disposes alike of
the claim of jurisdiction by a State court, or by a State
judge, to interfere with the authority of the United
States, whether that authority be exercised by a Fed-
eral officer or be exercised by a Federal tribunal."'
The inevitable conclusion to be drawn from the Rea
case, therefore, is that while the state's attempt to sub-
poena the officer would not be violative of the Court's man-
date as such, it would be necessarily unconstitutional and
inoperative under the supremacy clause. Thus it is evident
that what the Court has done in this case is to impose upon
the state courts a new rule of exclusion, forbidding, upon
proper procedure taken (by a federal injunction proceed-
ing), the introduction of evidence obtained by federal
officers in an illegal search and seizure."
4 U. S. Const. Art. VI, Cl. 2.
121 How. 506 (U. S. 1859).
OTarble's Case, 13 Wall. 397 (U. S. 1872).
OIbid, 403-4. See also Warren, Federal and State Court Interference,
43 Harv. L. Rev. 345, 353-59 (1930).
10 This is clearly recognized by 'Mr. Justice Harlan, who, In his dissent,
says, "the injunction will operate quite as effectively, albeit indirectly, to
stultify the state prosecution as if it had been issued directly against New
Mexico or its officials." Supra, n. 1, dis. op. 294, 295.
Continuing, Justice Harlan further raised the question of whether other
methods of exclusion will be adopted where injunctive relief against federal
[VOL. XVI
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THE ARFA IN GErmuL
The admissibility of evidence obtained as the product
of an unreasonable search and seizure has been the subject
of much debate in the American courts and by learned
authors since 1886, when, in Boyd v. United States," the
Supreme Court declared unconstitutional a statute requir-
ing defendant to produce his books and papers in court to
be used against him in a federal action to forfeit his prop-
erty. The invalidity was based partly on the ground that
this was, in effect, an unreasonable search and seizure, the
Court holding that even Congress cannot authorize the
admission of evidence secured through an unreasonable
search and seizure in violation of the Fourth Amendment.
The common law having declared that the illegal source of
evidence in no way affected its admissibility, 2 the new
rule constituted a sharp departure from what had previ-
ously been accepted without question and raised new prob-
lems, primarily: (1) to what agents of procurement the
rule would apply, and (2) whether the policy would apply
to both the federal and state courts. With the decision of
the Rea case, it appears that the answers to these two ques-
officers would be too late, terming the situation a race between a federal
injunction proceeding and a state trial, and expressing the belief that there
would be no further relief given. In the case of testimonial evidence, the
time lag between the filing of the complaint and the trial of the case would
provide ample opportunity to secure a federal injunction.
But in the case of physical evidence, illegally seized and turned over to
State officers before even a temporary restraining order [Fed. Rules Civ.
Proc., Rule 65(b), 28 U. S. C. A. (1950 ed.)] could be gotten, or seized in a
federal-state joint effort and retained by the state officers, the problem
would be difficult. Contrary to the dissent's view, it would appear unlikely
that no relief at all would be given. Inaction under those circumstances
amounts to putting a premium on greater misconduct by a federal officer,
who, in addition to violating search and seizure prohibitions, is crafty
enough to evade the express policy of the Rea rule. Although jurisdiction
lies In the federal courts to enjoin the states from using such evidence
(28 U. S. C. A. (1950 ed.) Sec. 2283), exercise of that jurisdiction appears
doubtful in view of the recently accented aversion of federal courts to In-
terfere directly with state judicial proceedings. See Douglas v. Jeanette,
319 U. S. 157, 162 (1943) ; Darr v. Burford, 339 U. S. 200 (1950) ; Stefanelli
v. Minard, 342 U. S. 117 (1951) ; Amalgamated Clothing Workers v. Rich-
man Brothers, 348 U. S. 511 (1955). If the policy of the Rea case is to be
extended to cover such a situation, It would seem most probable that
Supreme Court supervision would be exercised upon certiorari, after the
case had run its course, thereby giving the States first opportunity to ex-
clude the evidence where Injunction against the Federal officer Is too late.
The combined effect of pre-trial suppression where practicable, and at-
trial exclusion where not, would be In harmony with the practice regarding
suppression of illegally seized evidence in federal criminal proceedings.
Fed. Rules Crim. Proc., Rule 41(e), 18 U. S. C. A. (1951 ed.). See Waldron
v. United States, infra, n. 18, 40 et 8eq.
'-116 U. S. 616 (1886).
8 WiooMn, EVIDECE (3rd ed. 1940) Sec. 2183, p. 4 et 8eq.
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tions have finally crystallized into a pattern capable of
rational understanding.
(a) In The Federal Courts. Most illustrative of the rules
employed in the federal courts is the case of Weeks v.
United States.8 Defendant's home was broken into, and
evidence was seized at two different intervals, first by state
police independently, and later by state police and a United
States marshal. The district court denied a pre-trial motion
to suppress and held all the evidence admissible. The
Supreme Court reversed, holding that it was error not to
suppress the evidence seized in the federal-state officers'
joint effort, but that it was not error to admit the evidence
seized by the state officers in their independent search,
merely affirming the common law rule in regard to the
latter.1
4
In the forty-two years that have followed, the Weeks
holdings have remained substantially unaltered. Evidence
illegally seized by federal officers, alone 5 or in collaboration
with state officials,' 6 is still held inadmissible, 7 and con-
victions secured by use of the improper evidence are
reversed."
As to illegal seizures by state officers, since Weeks the
Supreme Court has engaged in over four decades of virtual
silence." Significant, therefore, is Rule 26 of the Federal
Rules of Criminal Procedure ° which provides that unless
modified by Acts of Congress, the rules themselves, or sub-
sequent decisions,2 the common law principles of evidence
are to guide the federal courts. Since the common law
'a232 U. S. 383 (1914).
14 The Court, seven years later, held that the common law attitude of full
admissibility also applied to evidence larcenously seized by private parties.
Burdeau v. McDowell, 256 U. S. 465 (1921).
"United States v. Jeffers, 342 U. S. 48 (1951).
16 1Byars v. United States, 273 U. S. 28 (1927) ; Lustig v. United States,
338 U. S. 74 (1949).
17 See the cases collected in 52 A. L. R. 477, 481; 88 A. L. R. 348, 353;
150 A. L. R. 566, 572. This applies to the introduction of such evidence for
impeachment purposes as well as evidence-in-chief. Agnello v. United States,
269 U. S. 20 (1925). But where defendant voluntarily and affirmatively
perjures himself on direct examination, in anticipation of the government's
inability to introduce the illegally procured evidence, the privilege against
introduction is deemed to be waived. Walder v. United States, 347 U. S.
62 (1954).
McDonald v. United States, 335 U. S. 451 (1948). See also Waldron v.
United States, 219 F. 2d 37 (D. C. App. 1955).
19 Although there have been no express holdings on point, see dicta in
Feldman v. United States, 322 U. S. 487, 492 (1944), and Irvine v. Cali-
fornia, quoted, infra, n. 23.
18 U. S. C. A. (1951 ed.).
See 4 BA.moN, FEDERAL PRAC CE AND PROCEDUaE (1951), 173, See. 2150,
fn. 17.
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admits evidence illegally seized,22 and since there has been
no decision, statute, or rule to the contrary,23 the lower
United States courts have continuously and uniformly held
that evidence procured by state officers, even as a result of
an illegal search, is properly admissible."
(b) In The State Courts. The problem of admissibility
vel non becomes somewhat more intricate, for purposes of
analysis, when the state courts are examined. The chief
responsibility over rules of evidence in the state courts
rests with the states themselves,2" the Supreme Court
merely imposing upon them minimal standards of compli-
ance. It is not within the scope of this note to discuss the
individual state policies,26 but only the Supreme Court's
role in determining what may be admitted and what must
be excluded.
The leading case on this point is Wolf v. Colorado.27
State police officers had broken into Dr. Wolf's office,
arrested him for conspiring to commit abortion, and seized
articles on the premises, all without a search warrant.2 s
Upon conviction and affirmance by the Supreme Court of
Colorado, he brought certiorari. The Court was faced with
WIOORn. loc. cit. supra, n. 12.
The assumption that the common law rule prevails in these cases is the
basis upon which Byars v. United States and Lustig v. United States, supra,
n. 16, were decided, the latter being on the same day as Wolf v. Colorado,
infra, n. 27. Gambino v. United States, 275 U. S. 310 (1927), supplies the
lone exception to the rule. In the extraordinary case of a State officer acting
to enforce a federal law, evidence illegally seized by him is inadmissible
in a federal court. It Is felt that under such anomalous circumstances he
is at least a de facto federal officer. United States v. Cotter, 80 F. Supp. 590
(E. D. Va. 1948), and United States v. Irwin, 86 F. Supp. 362 (W. D.
Ark. 1949) in accord, general practice being sufficient to establish the fact
in the latter. But generally, "Even this Oourt has not seen fit to exclude
illegally seized evidence in federal cases unless a federal officer perpetrated
the wrong." - dictum, Irvine v. California, 347 U. S. 128, 136 (1954).
4 WGMORE, op. cit. supra, n. 12, Sec. 2184a, 41. See cases collected in 24
A. L. R. 1408, 1424 ; 32 A. L. R. 408, 414 ; 41 A. L. R. 1145, 1150 ; 52 A. L. R.
477, 485; 88 A. L. R. 348, 362; 134 A. L. R. 819, 827; 150 A. L. R. 566, 576.
Recent decisions to this effect are: Jaroshuk v. United States, 201 F. 2d 52
(9th Cir. 1953) ; Symons v. United States, 178 F. 2d 615 (9th Cir. 1949),
cert. den., 339 U. S. 985 (1950); Watson v. United States, 224 F. 2d 910
(5th Cir. 1955) ; Helton v. United States, 221 F. 2d 338 (5th Cir. 1955) ;
Frierson v. United States, 223 F. 2d 255 (6th Cir. 1955) ; United States v.
White, 228 F. 2d 832 (7th Cir. 1956). See also, Note, Admissibility In
Federal Courts of Evidence Obtained Illegally By State Authorities, 51 Col.
L. Rev. 128 (1951), criticizing the present state of the rule.
2Bailey v. Alabama, 219 U. S. 219, 238 (1911).
For Maryland modifications of the common law rule, see Md. Code
Supp. (1955) Art. 35, Sec. 5, the so-called 'Bouse Act. See also Notes,
Admissibility of Evidence Obtained By Unlawful Search and Seizure, 2 Md.
L. Rev. 147 (1938), and Equal Protection Clause of Fourteenth Amendment
No Bar to Territorial Classification Under Bouse Act, 14 Md. L. Rev.
299 (1954).
338 U. S. 25 (1949).
21Wolf v. People. 117 Colo. 279, 187 P. 2d 926 (1947).
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two questions: (1) Was the Fourth Amendment incorpor-
ated into the Fourteenth Amendment due process clause,
thereby making the seizure by the state officer an illegal
one; (2) If so, does the admission of evidence illegally
seized by a state officer in a state trial violate the minimal
standards imposed by the Supreme Court upon state trials?
The Court answered the first in the affirmative and the
second in the negative, holding that it is not violative of
any federal policy to admit evidence illegally seized by a
state officer in a state trial.2 9
With the recent decision of the Rea case, therefore, the
present policy of the Supreme Court can be stated as favor-
ing exclusion of illegally seized evidence from both federal
and state courts if procured by a federal law enforcement
officer, and permitting the introduction of evidence simi-
larly obtained by state officers. The true classification, as
we have seen, must be on the basis of who obtained the
evidence, not where it is sought to be introduced.
RATIONALE
With the above-stated developments in mind, it is proper
that we now ask what, if any, theoretical basis can support
their permanence.
Turning first to the specific constitutional prohibition, it
is obvious that the answer is not to be found there. The
Fourth Amendment is the original source of the unreason-
able search's illegality, but does it also necessitate the ex-
clusion of the evidence so obtained? Stated differently,
is the evidence itself unconstitutional? Boyd v. United
States3° ruled yes, disallowing even the right of Congress
to authorize its admissibility. If such a view were held
today, however, the rules would not be in their present
form. The proposition of unconstitutional evidence would
have to apply to the Fourteenth Amendment as well, since
it has incorporated the Fourth, and the rules of exclusion
would necessarily operate upon state officers as well as
federal, in both national and local courts. Those who sub-
scribe to this older view are among the dissenters to the
gAff'd in Irvine v. California, 8upra, n. 23, under aggravated circum-
stances. It should be noted that the first case to give forth with this pre-
cise holding was Adams v. New York, 192 U. S. 585 (1904), but Its reason-
ing was so muddied that it was believed to have been emasculated by the
Weeks case. Trimble, Search and Seizure under the Fourth Amendment as
Interpreted by the United States Supreme Court, 41 Ky. L. J. 196, 202
et seq. (1952).
S116 U. S. 616 (1886).
[VOL. XVI
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Wolf" and Irvine cases, an example being Mr. Justice
Douglas' dissent in the latter:
"I protest against this use of unconstitutional evi-
dence .... The Bill of Rights was designed to protect
every accused against practices of the police which
history showed were oppressive of liberty. The guar-
antee against unreasonable searches and seizures con-
tained in the Fourth Amendment was one of those
safeguards."32
Rejecting the inherent unconstitutionality theory, we
are left with the more modern interpretation, the expressed
belief that exclusion of illegally obtained evidence is pri-
marily a deterrent to the conduct which was its source. In
the Real' case, the Court applied this view:
"The only relief asked is against a federal agent,
who obtained the property as a result of the abuse of
process issued by a United States Commissioner....
In this posture we have then a case that raises not a
constitutional question but one concerning our super-
visory powers over federal law enforcement agen-
cies.... A Federal agent has violated the federal Rules
governing searches and seizures .... The obligation of
the federal agent is to obey the Rules. . . . They pre-
scribe standards for law enforcement. They are de-
signed to protect the privacy of the citizen, unless the
strict standards set for searches and seizures are satis-
fied. That policy is defeated if the federal agent can
flout them and use the fruits of his unlawful act either
in federal or state proceeding."34
Why, then, is it the function of the federal judiciary to
supervise the activity of federal officers more closely than
similar conduct of state affiliates? Mr. Justice Frankfurter's
opinion in Wolf v. Colorado is most helpful in this regard:
8 Supra, n. 27, dis. op8. 40, 41, 47.
Irvine v. California, supra, n. 23, dis. op. 149, 151. See also Mr. Justice
Rutledge's dissent in the Wolf case, supra, n. 27, 47.
- ... U. S ... , 76 S. Ct. 292 (1956). Remembering that the Court spoke
through Mr. Justice Douglas in this case, it would appear that he has
changed his view since Irvine v. California.
" Ibid, 294. The quoted material was taken from successive paragraphs.
Cf.: Murphy, J., dissenting in Wolf v. Colorado, supra, n. 27, 44: "The
conclusion is inescapable that but one remedy exists to deter violations
of the search and seizure clause. That Is the rule which excludes illegally
obtained evidence." While recognizing that deterrence is the basis of
the exclusionary rule, the actual value of the rule as a deterrent Is




"Granting that in practice, the exclusion of evidence
may be an effective way of deterring unreasonable
searches, it is not for this Court to condemn as falling
below the minimal standards assured by the Due Pro-
cess clause a State's reliance upon other methods
which, if consistently enforced, would be equally effec-
tive.... There are, moreover, reasons for excluding
evidence unreasonably obtained by the federal police
which are less compelling in the case of police under
State or local authority. The public opinion of a com-
munity can far more effectively be exerted against
oppressive conduct on the part of police directly re-
sponsible to the community itself than can local
opinion, sporadically aroused, be brought to bear upon
remote authority pervasively exerted throughout the
country.""5
When the particular malfeasance is on a local level, popular
opinion can exert its maximum pressure, and if the public
of the locality finds misconduct by its own officers suffi-
ciently objectionable, it is within their effective control to
authorize measures aimed at deterrence. But the invasion
of a California citizen's privacy by a federal officer is not
so likely to inflame a Congressman from Maine, or his con-
stituents, and the public opinion of one area is of diminished
importance when a national legislature must be appealed
to. Thus, a significant restraint is absent when a federal
officer engages in the illegal act, and the Court feels con-
strained to fill the vacuum. 6
Moreover, there is an additional factor to be considered,
the source of authority for applying these rules as deter-
rents. Since Congress is explicitly charged with policing
Wolf v. Colorado, supra, n. 27, 31 et seq.
w Where, however, on the state level, the anticipated public restraint is
also absent, and the state police misconduct becomes so severe as to be in-
tolerable, the Court will declare due process violated by the introduction
of the evidence repulsively obtained. Rochin v. California, 342 U. S. 165,
172 (1952).
"(W)e are compelled to conclude that the proceedings by which this
conviction was obtained do more than offend some fastidious squeamish-
ness or private sentimentalism about combatting crime too energetically.
This is conduct that shocks the conscience. Illegally breaking into the
privacy of the petitioner, the struggle to open his mouth and remove
what was there, the forcible extraction of his stomach's contents -
this course of proceeding by agents of government to obtain evidence
is bound to offend even hardened sensibilities. They are methods
too close to the rack and the screw to permit of constitutional dif-
ferentiation."
Severity, however, is a matter of degree, and where the line is to be
drawn is a problem which must be resolved on an individual basis. Differ-
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the requirements of the Fourteenth Amendment," it is
the policy of that body which should initially determine
the manner in which state misconduct is to be handled.
Undoubtedly, an illegal search by a state officer constitutes
a federal crime,8 but it has been held that Congress does
not mean to extend its regulations to the point of exclud-
ing the evidence disclosed. 9 On the other hand, authority
to exclude evidence obtained by a federal officer can be
readily found in the doctrine of checks and balances, justi-
fying more careful judicial scrutiny of the activity of a
subordinate member of the federal executive branch.40
ARioLD M. WEINER
Proximate Cause And Furtherance Of Design -
Felony-Murder And Guilt Of One Felon
For The Death Of His Accomplice
Commonwealth v. Thomas'
The defendant and Jackson held up and robbed a
butcher shop of a sum of money. Jackson was armed. When
the two men had gotten the money, they fled from the shop,
each going in a different direction. The proprietor of the
shop obtained his own gun and chased Jackson, and in an
exchange of gunfire, killed the fleeing felon. The defen-
dant was subsequently apprehended and indicted for the
murder of his slain accomplice. At the trial, the defendant
ences of opinion in such situations undoubtedly arise. In the Irvine case,
Mr. Justice Frankfurter dissented on the ground that the particular state
misconduct was intolerable, In his judgment being worse than a mere un-
reasonable search and seizure. He said:
"While there is In the case before us, as there was in Rochin, an
element of unreasonable search and seizure, what is decisive here, as
in Rochin, Is additional aggravating conduct which the Court finds
repulsive."
Irvine v. California, 347 U. S. 128, dis. op. 142, 144 (1954).
U. S. Const. Amend. XIV, Sec. 5.
Of. Screws v. United States, 325 U. S. 91 (1945).
Stefanelli v. Minard, 342 U. S. 117, 120 (1951).
,C,"Where powers are separated, each branch has its own powers and
prerogatives the exercise of which serves to restrain the other 'branches, this
creating a check-and-balance system. The latter had long been considered
a safe-guard against tyranny." FEROuSoN & McHENRY, ELMENTS OF
AMERICAN GOVERNMENT (1st ed. 1950) 52.
"Under separation of powers . . . the executive will restrict Its activity
to conduct under the law; for an Independent judiciary will serve as a check
on the executive." Gn'FFrr, THE IMPASSE or DEMORAcy (1939) 175.
1382 Pa. 39, 117 A. 2d 204 (1955)
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